Firms are less likely to use financial derivatives as they approach distress, even though theory predicts risk management is more valuable in these situations. By expanding the definition of hedging to include purchase obligations (POs) -non-cancelable forward contracts with suppliers -we are able to understand how firms hedge and whether hedging matters. We provide the first evidence that firms rely on POs during distress, often switching from derivatives to these contracts. Firms also initiate POs in response to liquidity shocks. Moreover, compared to hedging with derivatives, hedging with POs enables higher investment levels during times of financial distress. Firms adjust -but do not cease -hedging near distress and this mitigates underinvestment.
are better positioned than financial institutions to provide liquidity during downturns (e.g., GarciaAppendini and Montoriol-Garriga, 2013) . Even if firms in distress are barred from traditional derivative markets due to collateral constraints, their suppliers still may be willing to write forward contracts. Suppliers also have an additional incentive to assist customers during temporary negative shocks because the supplier's value is a function of customers' future cash flows (Petersen and Rajan, 1997) . If the customer is likely to continue its operations, the expected value of its long-term cash flows to the supplier may offset any increased risk associated with financial distress. Further, evidence on long-term supply contracts shows that supplier-customer contracts rarely have collateral requirements and frequently are not subject to financial covenants (Costello, 2013) . We expect that collateral requirements and financial covenants are even less likely for purchase obligations given their relatively shorter horizons (generally 1-3 years). This flexibility makes POs advantageous to customers during distress.
Following up on these arguments, we build a simple theoretical framework to understand the choice between derivatives and POs when firms face collateral constraints. The model captures the flexibility associated with PO contracts by assuming that firms can pledge more future income to suppliers than to financial institutions. This additional source of pledegability creates an advantage for POs relative to a derivatives contract when a firm's financial position is weaker. In particular, we study how a firms' existing hedging strategy affects a firm's ability to invest when its financial position weakens. Firms may choose to hold an imperfect hedging position in order to save pledgeable income, which affects the firm's ability to finance investments in bad states of the world. In contrast, POs can be collateralized using the additional pledgeable income that the supplier can extract from the firm, allowing the PO-reliant firm to increase investment in bad states of the world relative to a firm relying on futures. Nevertheless, POs do not always dominate futures because firms are likely to pay a premium to hedge using POs depending on the terms that they can negotiate with their suppliers. If this premium is large enough, firms may choose to hedge using futures despite pledgeability constraints. In addition, the stronger is a firm's financial health, the more it can hedge when using the future's contract. Thus, stronger financial health reduces the relative cost of hedging with futures.
Our results confirm that firms increase purchase obligation usage as their financial condition worsens and reduce derivatives usage. We distinguish between economic and financial distress by using operating margins, as in Andrade and Kaplan (1998) . Financial distress leads firms to stop using derivatives and to initiate the use of purchase obligations, while firms entering economic distress do not show increased propensities to use purchase obligations. In addition, we also consider the impact of a likely exogenous shock to financial constraint. Specifically, we use the failure of a firm's line of credit lead arranger as a shock to a firm's financial condition (Sufi, 2009, Chava and Purnanandam, 2011) . Firms experiencing this shock increase their usage of purchase obligations, relative to firms that do not suffer this financial shock. This evidence supports the hypothesis that firms adjust their hedging choices as their financial condition deteriorates and that suppliers play a role in the risk management policies of financially distressed firms.
Next, we study the effect of existing purchase obligations on investment during times of distress. We start by comparing the investment behavior of firms that hedge with purchase obligations (PO hedgers) with firms that hedge using derivatives (futures hedgers) -a control group of firms which are on average larger and financially stronger (Almeida, Hankins, and Williams, 2017) . We find that PO hedgers invest relatively more than futures hedgers during distress events. Although a firm's hedging decision is endogenous, limiting the sample to active hedgers and making financial hedgers the control group minimizes the potential bias. All of these firms actively manage input cost volatility and the control group should have greater financial flexibility. Further, since our hypothesis that distress leads to an increased reliance on forward contracts with suppliers corresponds with evidence from the trade credit literature, we ensure that changing trade credit relationships do not drive our results. 1 We employ two additional approaches to address endogeneity concerns. First, we consider a specification in which we use the failure of a firm's line of credit lead arranger as a shock to a firm's financial condition to better distinguish between financial and economic distress. Further, we instrument for the presence of PO hedging (relative to futures hedging) using supplier characteristics. With each approach, we document higher capital expenditures for PO hedgers relative to futures hedgers following distress.
We therefore uncover evidence that supports the prediction in Froot et al. (1993) that hedging during distress may alleviate underinvestment. Our evidence is also consistent with Petersen and Rajan (1997) , which suggests that suppliers will assist customers in financial distress but not in economic distress. In highlighting the importance of purchase obligations to firms in distress, our paper contributes to the literatures on the impact of financial distress (Opler and Titman, 1994; Andrade and Kaplan, 2002; Campello, et al., 2011) , the interaction between product markets and corporate hedging (Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman, 2007) , and how constrained firms manage risk (Fehle and Tsyplakov, 2005; Rampini and Viswanathan, 2010) .
We organize the paper as follows. Section 1 provides intuition from our model to generate our testable hypotheses. Section 2 describes our hand-collected data on purchase obligations and 1 As we show in Section 1, purchase obligations are likely to relax financing constraints by more than trade credit financing does, despite the fact that both rely on increased pledgeability when contracting with suppliers. The key argument is that the firm can use POs to transfer cash across future states by making additional payments to suppliers in good states of the world. derivatives use as well as the rest of the panel data used in the analysis. Section 3 documents changing risk management choices as firms enter distress. Although this conclusion is consistent with evidence from the trade credit literature on the importance of suppliers to firms in distress (Petersen and Rajan, 1997) , it contradicts the implication that distressed firms stop hedging (Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan, 2014) . In Section 4, we document that distressed firms with purchase obligations maintain higher investment levels -consistent with Bessembinder (1991) and Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) . By including purchase obligations, we gain a broader picture of how distressed firms operate and a richer understanding of product market relationships. This has important implications for agency conflicts in distressed firms (e.g., Stulz, 1990 , Purnanandam 2008 ). Section 5 concludes.
Theory of Risk Management Alternatives and Effects on Investment
We develop a simple theoretical framework to understand the determinants of a firm's choice between hedging through purchase obligations (POs) or futures contracts, focusing on the role of financial health. We also examine the model's implications for investment conditional on financial distress. We present this model in Appendix B. The model closely resembles that in Almeida, Hankins and Williams (2017) . In the model, we assume that the firm can use POs or futures to manage its exposure to positions such as variation in input prices (e.g., hedgeable shocks). In addition, the firm is exposed to a shock that cannot be hedged with futures or POs (non-hedgeable shock). The modeling of this shock follows Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) . The firm either holds cash or uses a bank credit line to manage this liquidity shock. It also can use cash to manage the hedgeable exposure, but as shown in AHW (2017) this strategy will typically be inefficient if futures are available because cash consumes more pledgeable income (collateral) than futures. The firm's hedging policy potentially is affected by collateral constraints as in Rampini and Viswanathan (2010) . In this paper, we follow Holmstrom and Tirole and model the collateral constraint as a quantity constraint on the firm's pledgeable income. Limited pledgeable income creates a motivation for hedging, as a negative shock to cash flow arising from the hedgeable position may cause inefficient liquidation of the firm's investment. In addition, limited pledgeability affects the firm's choice of which tool it uses for hedging. The futures position requires the firm to post collateral initially (at the time the futures position is opened) while the PO (forward) contract can be settled ex-post.
2 Because of this wedge, hedging through POs can increase the firm's pledgeable income and relaxes financial constraints. This mechanism reduces the desirability of futures for financially weak firms, as in Rampini and Viswanathan (2010) .
However, unlike exchange traded derivatives, POs are the product of a bargaining game between customers and suppliers. Some firms will have more or less ability to negotiate favorable terms with their suppliers and this may affect the cost of using POs. We capture this situation by assuming that the firm must pay a premium to hedge using POs.
3
One of our goals is to examine the model's implication for investment conditional on financial distress. In particular, we want to study how the firms's existing hedging strategy affects a firm's ability to invest when its financial position weakens. To do so, we depart from AHW (2017) by assuming that the firm can choose the fraction of the required future investment that it 2 The ex-post settlement of purchase obligations can arise from the supplier's greater ability to extract pledgeable income from the buyer. In the model, we capture this situation by assuming that the firm can pledge more income to the counterparty of the forward contract (e.g. the supplier) than to other external financiers. The trade credit literature relies on a similar rationale to motivate the positive response of trade credit to negative financial shocks (Petersen and Rajan, 1997 , Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga, 2013 , Shenoy and Williams, 2017 . 3 AHW (2017) also model settlement risk as an additional friction that the firm incurs when using POs. We abstract from settlement risk here.
decides to finance in the bad state of the world. The "bad state" in the model is the one in which both the non-hedgeable and the hedgeable shock materialize, requiring the firm to use its liquidity and hedging positions to help finance the required investment. While the firm would like to finance the entire investment, it may be constrained in its ability to do so and may have to scale down.
4
Because the futures position must be collateralized with the firm's pledgeable income, it may become optimal for the firm to reduce its futures position in order to save pledgeable income (as in Rampini and Viswanathan (2010) ). An imperfect hedging position will then limit the firm's ability to finance its investment in the bad state of the world. In contrast, the PO can be collateralized using the additional pledgeable income that the supplier can extract from the firm, allowing the PO-reliant firm to increase investment in the bad state of the world relative to a firm relying on futures. Notice that this result does not mean that POs always dominate futures. The premium associated with the PO contract may be high if the firm's supplier has significant bargaining power, and thus a firm may still choose to use futures despite imperfect hedging arising from limited pledgeability.
5
In addition, the stronger is a firm's financial health, the more it can hedge when using the future's contract. Thus, financial health reduces the effective cost of hedging with futures. The effective cost of hedging using futures also depends on the expected losses of not being able to finance investments in the bad state of the world. When these losses are low, futures become more attractive relative to POs (which provide greater insurance against underinvestment in bad states).
We summarize here the specific implications that we derive from the model 4 In particular, we assume that the costs of hedging with POs and futures are low enough that firms would always choose to fully hedge against the shock in the absence of a pledgeability constraint. 5 Notice also that a high PO premium does not necessarily tighten the pledgeability constraint because the firm can pledge more income when using the PO contract. Implications 1. and 2. are also derived in AHW (2017). Our contribution in this paper is to focus on testing Implication 2 as well as introducing and testing Implication 3 (which is new to this paper).
We also consider the possibility that the firm may borrow from the supplier to mitigate the cash flow impact of the hedgeable shock. That is, conditional on being in the bad state of the world, the firm can use the additional pledgeable income that the supplier can capture to raise additional financing (e.g., trade credit financing). The model then shows that the PO is a more efficient way to use the additional pledgeable income that contracting with the supplier can provide, relative to trade credit. The key advantage of the PO relative to trade credit is that the firm can use POs to transfer cash across states. For example, suppose the firm uses the PO to insure against the increase in the price of an input. If the price of the input goes down rather than up, the firm will make an additional payment to the supplier (the difference between the guaranteed and the market price).
This additional payment compensates the supplier for the better terms it can provide in the bad state (when the price goes up). Thus, purchase obligations are likely to relax financing constraints by more than trade credit financing does, despite the fact that both rely on the same source of pledgeability. if the firm reports using commodity derivatives in its 10-K filings, and zero otherwise. We follow the methodology in Almeida, Hankins, and Williams (2017) and use a combination of automated Perl scripting and hand collection to collect these two variables. We note in the summary statistics in Table 1 that PO users represent 23% of the population whereas commodity derivative users represent 19%. These data are consistent with Guay and Kothari (2003) and Almeida, Hankins and Williams (2017) , who note that a large percentage of a firm's risks are unhedgeable with traditional derivatives.
Data

Purchase obligations, commodity derivatives, and investment
To avoid the concern that firms with purchase obligations are financially stronger or more sophisticated at risk management than the average firm, we often limit our control group to financial hedgers. PO_Hedge is an indicator variable which equals one if the firm uses a purchase obligation (PO Contract) and zero if the firm exclusively uses commodity derivatives (Commodity We use lagged assets as the denominator to isolate changes in investment not total assets and our goal is to interpret the effect on the numerator.
Contract
Financial Distress and Shocks
Although our broad focus is on whether firms adjust risk management in distress, we recognize that the form of distress may matter. Suppliers may assist financially distressed but economically viable customers yet avoid more seriously economically distressed firms. We define corporate distress as an Altman's (1968) Z score less than 1.81 and entering distress is based on a change in that variable relative to the prior year. Following Andrade and Kaplan (1998), Financial Distress equals one if the firm has a positive operating margin but is in distress (as defined by Zscore less than 1.81) while Econ Distress equals one if the firm has a Z-score less than 1.81 and a negative operating margin.
We also use the failure of a firm's line of credit lead arranger as a shock to a firm's financial constraints. Sufi (2009) argues that the lack of a credit line is a good proxy variable for a financially constrained firm and Chava and Purnanandam (2011) also use bank shocks to proxy for constraint.
We begin by identifying firms that have a line of credit using Perl script. We use search terms identical to those in Sufi (2009) . After identifying firms with credit lines, we identify their lead arrangers using DealScan. LOC_Shock equals one if the firm's lead arranger on a line of credit failed during the prior year. DealScan reports a range of relationship titles. We define lenders classified as lead arranger, mandated arranger, coordinating arranger, bookrunner, and senior managing agent as primary lending relationships and we categorize these as lead arrangers. Bank failures are identified from FDIC data and major investment bank failures during 2008. We also update our data to represent bank mergers and subsidiary names using the data from Schwert (2018).
Instruments and other control variables
We additionally control for Ln(Assets), defined as the natural log of the firm's total book assets, Sales, defined as the firm's total revenues divided by total book assets, and R&D Intensity.
Further, given that trade credit may play a role in the supplier/customer purchasing relationship, especially during times of distress, we control for AP in our tests, defined as the firm's outstanding accounts payables divided by total assets. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
For our instrumental variables (IV) tests, we require instruments correlated with both the choice of PO versus derivatives as well as the interaction of that variable with the distress variable.
We use three primary instruments (% Input Traded, Supplier Tangibility, and Supplier Bargaining
Power, all described in detail below) which relate to the choice between risk management tools but not directly related to within firm changes in investment. Then, we use the interaction of the supplier characteristics instruments with the distress measure to instrument for the interaction. We present test statistics on the validity and strength of the instruments in the results section. Next, we calculate two supplier industry characteristics that relate to the use of purchase obligations. Supplier Tangibility is related to supply contract settlement risk and the usefulness of purchase obligations as a hedge while Supplier Bargaining Power is associated with the use of purchase obligation for contracting/industrial organization issues. Both are calculated in a manner similar to the % Input Traded. We calculate each supplier industry's Tangibility following Almeida and Campello (2007) and then use two-digit NAICS codes to construct Industry Tangibility as the median industry measure. We then sales weight these industries using the BEA IO tables to calculate Supplier Tangibility. For each customer industry, we weight each six-digit supplier industry characteristic by the percentage of input they supply to the customer industry according to the "Use" table from the Input-Output tables.
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where j is the firm's primary six-digit IO industry, and i is the six-digit IO industry for each supplier industry, n is the number of industries which sell inputs to the reference firm, and the
Industry Input Coefficient is the percentage of industry j's input which comes from industry i.
We can calculate the Supplier Bargaining Power for each supplier industry using two-digit NAICS codes and then sales-weight them using the IO tables. For each customer industry, we weight each six-digit supply industry characteristic by the percentage of input they supply to the customer industry according to the "Use" table from the Input-Output tables.
where j is the firm's primary six-digit IO industry, and i is the six-digit IO industry for each supplier industry, n is the number of industries which sell inputs to the reference firm, Industry HHI is the Herfindahl index of the industry and the Industry Input Coefficient is the percentage of industry j's input which comes from industry i.
Distress and POs
Cross-sectional variation by distress
In contrast to the early theoretical literature on corporate hedging (i.e., Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993)), Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014) financial distress show hedging levels on par to the full sample as reported in Table 1 .
Next, we consider time-series changes in our PO and derivatives variables on the extensive margin. First, we create Stop Derivatives Use, which equals one if the firm reported using commodity derivatives at t-1 and does not report the derivatives at t, zero otherwise. We also generate New PO Contract, which equals one if the firm reports using a PO at time t and no PO at t-1, zero otherwise. We then estimate t-tests based on the form of distress. A firm "enters" one of these distress conditions when the variable equals zero at t-1 and one at time t.
In Panel B, we document that firms are significantly more likely to stop using financial derivatives upon entering distress than firms which are not. However, the change in hedging is limited to the population entering financial distress. Moreover, we document a significant higher PO initiation in the Financial Distress subsample. As financially distressed firms cease using financial hedging, we observe an increased reliance on forward contracts with suppliers. The same cannot be said for the Econ Distress subsample, consistent with suppliers being unwilling to support customers with poor economic prospects (Petersen and Rajan (1997) ).
Since the evidence indicates that firms entering financial distress appear to switch between using financial derivatives and using purchase obligations, we test this intuition directly in Table   2 Panel C. We observe that firms which stop using derivatives are more likely to initiate a new PO contract. This is true whether we compare them to the full population of firms or limit the analysis to firms using derivatives in the prior year. Figure 1 also documents this substitution graphically.
We center t=0 around the Enter Financial Distress date and graph the percentage of the sample initiating new contracts or halting their financial derivatives in a given year. We indeed document that the percentage of firms that stop hedging with derivatives increases in t-1 and the initiation of new POs increases at time t. In sum, our univariate evidence is consistent with firms halting financial derivatives usage in distress, consistent with prior literature. However, in contrast to the notion that firms cease hedging, we find that firm change their risk management -using more POs. Focusing on the within firm response when firms stop using derivatives greatly reduces the sample size but we continue to document evidence of switching. Firms which stop using derivatives initiate or increase their use of purchase obligations. Table 4 expands this evidence on the changing hedging behavior to examine the intensive margin. We examine changes in the level of PO use across subsamples based expected costs of distress, similar to those in Opler and Titman (1994) . Specifically, we split the sample based on whether the firm operates in an industry with an HHI above/below the industry median (High Competition), whether the R&D investment is high/low (defined as above the median for non-zero R&D firms) (High R&D), and whether asset tangibility is high/low (Low Tangibility). These firms may face higher costs of distress. For example, rivals in concentrated industries have larger expected gains to eliminating financial weaker competitors, and firms in higher R&D supply chains produce more specialized products and are more at risk of losing customers when distressed.
Multivariate tests -hedging and distress
Likewise, collateral constraints are more likely to bind in distress at therefore firms with low asset tangibility are more vulnerable (Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014) ). We expect to see firms increasing POs more in response to distress when they are in these three subsamples. Models 1 presents the average effect while the Models 2 -4 show the response across firms with higher distress costs. Consistent with the cost of distress literature, we find that Enter Fin Distress increases purchase obligation levels for firms in concentrated industries, firms with high R&D, and firms with low tangibility. This cross-sectional evidence on the level of PO use also highlights that not all purchase obligations are used for hedging purposes. Some supply contracts are written to address contracting issues such as relationship specific investment (Almeida, Williams, and
Hankins, 2017) and we wouldn't expect those to adjust for risk management motivations.
If POs are recognized as a hedging tool for constrained firms, we would expect firms to initiate new contracts when hit by an exogenous liquidity shock. Table 5 presents evidence on PO use in response to a shock to the firm line of credit. (As noted in Section 2, LOC_Shock equals one if the firm's lead arranger on a line of credit failed during the prior year.) We run this analysis on the full sample as well as limiting it to financially healthy firms (Z > 3) to preclude the concern that the firm contributed to the bank's failure. Across both samples, firms exposed to a LOC shock are more likely to initiate a new PO contract. This is robust to the inclusion of industry or firm fixed effects and all regressions include year dummies and firm-level control variables. Coupled with existing evidence that distressed firms lose the ability to hedge through financial markets (i.e, Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014) ), firms appear to attempt to replace the lost ability to hedge in financial markets via product-market contracts. Interestingly, we document little relationship between the LOC shock and financial hedging. To the extent that the liquidity shock of losing the lead arranger on one's line of credit is unrelated to the firm's collateral position, we view these results as consistent with Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan.
Hedging, Distress, and Investment
Hedging, distress, and underinvestment -OLS results.
So far, we have shown hedging activity changes -but does not cease -when firms approach distress or experience an exogenous shock. We now explore the implications for investment policy. As POs are the result of contracting between two firms, we do not have exogenous variation in their availability but take two distinct approaches to addressing this issue.
As discussed earlier, we compare PO users to firms using financial hedging (PO_Hedge) to minimize the concern that using POs is correlated with financially stronger firms (where suppliers are willing to write contracts) or firms managing input price risk differ from the average firm.
Focusing on PO_Hedge -and specific treatment/control group -allows us to highlight how the investment outcome varies with distress depending on the type of hedging. In other words, conditional on the firm's decision to hedge input costs, we are interested in whether their specific hedging choice (POs or derivatives) affects the ability to invest in distress. We regress CAPEX on POs to hedge are less prone to the collateral-type problems affecting firms hedging via financial markets and this partially offsets the underinvestment problem in distress.
Broadly, the above results are consistent with the hypotheses that 1) firms that use commodity derivatives to hedge indeed face limitations when they are constrained, leading to an 9 All results are robust to the exclusion of M/B from the baseline regressions.
underinvestment problem, and 2) firms that use POs to hedge are able to partially offset this problem in financial distress.
Instrumental Variables
While comparing purchase obligation users to firms which exclusively use commodity derivatives evaluates investment in distress to a set of firms which has better access to capital, there is a potential that suppliers are willing to write purchase obligations contracts when they have private information about the firm's prospects. To address this potential selection issue, we confirm that POs enable distressed firms to maintain higher investment using an instrumental variable analysis. Since our interest is in the interaction of hedging and distress, we must instrument for both PO_Hedget-2 and PO_Hedget-2*Distress. As discussed in Section 2.3, our primary instruments are % Input Traded and Supplier Tangibility, as well as both variables interacted with the Distress measure. The primary instruments proxy for the availability and settlement risk of purchase obligation contracts (Almeida, Hankins, and Williams (2017) ). Table   7 reports the coefficient estimates as well as the relevant test statistics related to first stage F statistics, under-identification, and weak instrumental variables. The first system (columns 1-3) includes firm fixed effects and the second system (columns 4-6) include firm and year fixed effects.
Our IV results in Tables 6 and 7 , we next proceed with two robustness checks.
In Table 8 , we use two alternative PO variables to confirm the impact of POs on investment during distress. In Models 1-3, we use PO_Hedget-1 instead of PO_Hedget-2 as our key second stage right-hand side variable. As in Table 6 , the timing of observed hedging doesn't affect the interpretation. We document similar results when hedging decisions are instrumented for contemporaneously with distress. Finally, we use PO/COGSt-2 as the key second stage right-hand side variable to investigate whether the level of purchase obligations affect investment. Using the same instrumental variables, which have first stage F-statistics of 24.69 and 9.45, we again document a negative distress coefficient and a positive interaction coefficient. Thus, we continue to find that POs enhance the ability of firms to invest in distress.
Cash and Trade Credit
Facing a deteriorating financial condition, a firm may adjust more than the form of hedging or the level of investment. One potential concern is that cash is an alternative hedging tool (i.e., Almeida et al (2014)). We therefore test whether or not firms increase cash holdings in response to financial distress in Table 9 . We estimate an OLS model in Model 1. Models 2 and 3 are IV models with firm fixed effects, and firm and year fixed effects, respectively. (For conciseness, we only report the second stage results in this table but the instruments are the same as in Table 7 .)
We detect no significant relation between PO_Hedget-2* Financial Distresst-1 and changes in Cash.
A related concern is that there may be a spurious correlation between PO behavior and trade credit activity. For example, suppliers are known to issue more downstream trade credit to distressed customers (e.g., Shenoy and Williams, 2017) . Cunat (2007) and Garcia-Appendini and Monteriol-Garriga (2013) find that suppliers are liquidity providers during periods of financial constraint. The enhanced investment activity therefore may be the result of improved trade credit financing, and the PO usage would then be generated by a spurious correlation between increased trade credit activity and purchasing activity. Although we control for trade credit in our multivariate tests, we directly address this issue by considering accounts payable (AP) as the dependent variable in models 4-6 of Table 9 . Again, we present the results from the OLS with firm fixed effects regression as well as the IV analysis with and without year dummies. We document no significant coefficient on PO_Hedge*Financial Distress in any specification, suggesting that increasing trade credit does not explain the increased propensity to use POs in distress. We omit lagged AP in these tests to avoid the dynamic panel problem, but our results are robust to including this control variable.
All of the multivariate analysis examining the impact of POs during distress is consistent across Tables 6 -9. Hedging with supply contracts appears to help firms alleviate the underinvestment problem for firms with financial distress or those facing an exogenous shock to financial flexibiity. This buttresses earlier evidence that purchase obligations are a risk management tool (Almeida, Hankins, and Williams, 2017) . Forward contracts with suppliers provide a useful hedge during times of distress, enabling higher investment levels relative to firms that relying on financial derivatives.
Conclusions
This paper revisits the question of how and whether firms hedge in distress. Countering newer empirical evidence that firms appear to reduce risk management near distress, we expand the definition of risk management to include purchase obligations and find results more consistent with theoretical predictions of Froot et al. (1993) . Firms entering financial distress are more likely to use POs than financial derivatives for hedging, even switching risk management from derivatives to supply contracts. This is consistent with the trade credit evidence on the importance of suppliers in times of distress. Importantly, the ability to hedge using POs allows firms to minimize underinvestment during financial distress.
This paper highlights that firms continue to hedge in distress, but adjust their risk management choices. Moreover, this impacts investment. While negotiated pricing and settlement risk make purchase obligations suboptimal to an exchange traded contract for a financial healthy firm, POs relax the collateral constraints associated with financial derivatives and appear to provide more flexibility for constrained firms. Shock represents an exogenous financial shock -the failure to the firm's lead arranger on its credit line. To avoid concerns that the firm contributed to the bank's failure, we rerun all analysis with only financially health firms (Z>3). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and ***, **, *, and + represent statistical significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
New Contract Stop Derivatives
All Z > 3 All Z > 3 (1) (2) (3) (4)(5)
Table 7 -IV Estimates
This table reports multivariate instrumental variables (IV) estimates that predict CAPEX using instrumented PO_Hedget-2 and PO_Hedget-2 *Distress. We instrument using twice lagged % Input Traded and Supplier Tangibility, as well as the interaction between both variables with our lagged financial distress measure. All models also contain control variables, along with a variety of firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and ***, **, *, and + represent statistical significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Indicator variable that equals one if the firm has a Z-score less than 1.81 and it has a positive operating margin.
Econ Distress
Indicator variable that equals one if the firm has a Z-score less than 1.81 and it has a negative operating margin. 
Supplier Tangibility
Weighted-average percentage of suppliers' tangibility ratios, using the BEA tables and the tangibility definition from Almeida and and Campello (2007) .
Supplier Bargaining Power
Weighted-average supplier industry HHI, using the BEA tables.
Following Holmström and Tirole (1998), we assume that there is a liquidity premium q associated with cash holdings (the firm pays a price q > 1 for cash at the initial date 0). Given this, the firm will be able to continue in state λ if:
We assume that this condition holds (that is, the firm has sufficient pledgeable income to fund I, λρ and the date-0 liquidity premium). The associated payoff is:
which we assume to be greater than zero (the project is still positive NPV after accounting for the liquidity premium).
In addition to the shock in state λ, the firm is exposed to a (zero mean) additional shock which is modeled as in Almeida, Hankins and Williams (2017) . With probability x = 0.5, there is a shortfall equal to −μ, and with probability (1 -x) = 0.5 the firm gains μ. The key difference between this shock and the previous one is that the exposure associated with x can be hedged, either with an operational hedge or derivatives. For example, we can assume that the variation in the required investment ρ is not contractible (it is firm-specific and due to the firm's own performance), while the exposure μ is due to variation in input prices. State x is a state in which input prices are high.
How does the exposure associated with x affect the firm? Notice that eliminating the exposure in state 1 − λ is irrelevant. It reduces the variance of cash flows but has no effect on investment policy or the firm's payoff. On the other hand, in state λ, the firm has an incentive to eliminate this exposure because it will cause inefficient liquidation. If the firm holds cash equal to C * and input prices go up (state x), then the firm will face a shortfall equal to −μ and will not have sufficient pledgeable income to continue.
We depart from Almeida, Hankins and Williams (2018) by assuming that the firm can choose the fraction of the required investment ρ + μ that it decides to pay in the bad state λx (partial liquidation). One possible interpretation is that the firm reduces its demand for inputs and thus needs to scale down if both shocks ρ and μ happen. We denote this fraction by θ, so that the firm invests θ(ρ + μ ). We assume that if θ < 1, there is a linear effect on both the payoff of the investment and pledgeable income. The total payoff goes to θR, and pledgeable income goes to θρ0.
Hedging with futures
The firm can hedge the risk associated with x by opening a futures position. The firm commits to making a payment which we denote by f ≤ μ if the shock does not happen, in exchange for receiving a payment equal to f if the shock does happen. For each f, and given the optimal cash holding of C * , the firm's budget constraint in state λ(1 -x) is:
The firm always continues in this state since C * = ρ -ρ0 is sufficient to cover the shortfall in pledgeable income. In state λx there can be partial continuation and thus the budget constraint is:
The firm's hedging position f is a function of the fraction that the firm chooses to continue:
In particular, if θ = 1 (no liquidation), we must have full hedging (f = μ). Partial liquidation allows the firm to reduce its hedging position to f(θ) < μ.
As in Almeida, Hankins and Williams (2018) , the main friction associated with futures comes from the margin account that the firm needs to open with the futures exchange. We assume that the required amount is given by ζf, with ζ < 1. The margin account will then be equivalent to an increase in cash holdings (it needs to be in place at date-0). Assuming that the exchange pays an interest rate on the margin account that is equivalent to what the firm earns on liquid assets, the margin account will create a liquidity premium equal to (q -1)ζf. Thus, when using futures the firm will achieve the following payoff:
In this expression the term (λ(1-θ)/2)( R -ρ) is the cost of liquidating the project (which happens with probability λ(1-θ)/2), and (q -1) ζf(θ) is the cost of the margin position. We assume that partial liquidation of the project reduces the payoff function Uf (θ), that is:
If this assumption does not hold the futures position is too costly implying that the optimal θ is zero. Assumption (8) rules out this trivial case.
The futures position f(θ) is feasible when:
A + ρ0 + (λ (1 -θ)/2)(ρ -ρ0) ≥ I + λρ + (q -1) (C * + ζf(θ)) (9)
In this expression, notice that partial liquidation θ < 1 relaxes the feasibility constraint. Thus, given the assumption in (8), the optimal solution with futures hedging is to pick the highest possible θ that satisfies equation (9).
Result 1: Under futures hedging, the optimal θ is equal to min (θ*, 1), where θ* is defined as:
A + ρ0 + (λ (1 -θ*)/2)(ρ -ρ0) ≥ I + λρ + (q -1) (C * + ζf(θ*)) (10)
Notice that θ* is an weakly increasing function of A and ρ0. The associated futures position is:
And the payoff is given by Equation (7) evaluated at θ*.
Hedging with purchase obligations
We model hedging using supply contracts (purchase obligations or POs) as in Almeida, Hankins and Williams (2017) . If one assumes that the exposure μ is due to variation in input prices then hedging with POs is equivalent to contracting on date-0 on a fixed price that does not depends on the specific realization of input prices. This position can be interpreted as a position in a forward contract. The firm commits to making a payment of F ≤ μ to the supplier if input prices decrease, and receives a payment equal to F if input prices increase.
The trade-off of using POs also follows AHW. Given that the variation in input prices is zero mean, the actuarially fair date-0 price would be zero. However, given that the supplier may have some bargaining power, the price is likely to be positive (and increasing with the supplier's bargaining power). Thus, the ex-ante price for a forward position of F is kF > 0.
As in AHW, the key advantage of a forward contract with a supplier is that it can relax financing constraints. As is standard in the trade credit literature, the supplier may be in a position to extract more pledgeable income from buyers relative to external investors due to the value of the trading relationship, better monitoring technology or additional information about the costumer. We capture this idea by assuming that pledgeable income goes up to ρ'0 > ρ0 for contracts that have the supplier as a counterparty. Other than a purchase obligation, costumers and supplier can use trade credit to mitigate the variation in input prices.
We assume throughout that the increase in pledgeable income is sufficient to pay the premium in the forward contract, that is k μ ≤ ρ'0 -ρ0. We also assume that hedging with the supply contract increases the firm's payoff, which requires that λ 2 ( R -ρ) > k μ.
Under these assumptions the feasibility constraint for a forward contract is the same as in the case with no hedging (equation (2) above). Thus, with the forward contract partial liquidation is never optimal (θF = 1). In particular, the firm always chooses a forward position equal to F* = μ (full hedging). The firm's ex-ante payoff is however reduced by the magnitude of the forward premium: UF = R -I -λ ρ -(q -1) C * -kμ (12) AHW also allow for an additional friction affecting hedging with forward contracts which is that there can be counterparty settlement risk. We abstract from this possibility here. In addition, notice that we are assuming that cash holdings are constant at C* in both cases (hedging with futures or forwards). There can be meaningful interactions between hedging and optimal cash holdings in both cases. In particular, the firm may be able to use the additional pledgeable income ρ'0 -ρ0 to reduce cash holdings. In that case the financing advantage of purchase obligations may increase.
We abstract from this possibility for now.
Before analyzing the trade-off between forwards and futures, consider the possibility that the firm may borrow from the supplier to mitigate the negative shock μ. That is, conditional on being in the bad state λx the firm can use the additional pledgeable income ρ'0 -ρ0 to raise funding to pay for the outflow μ. That possibility, which would capture trade credit financing, requires the firm to have sufficient pledgeable income to pay for μ, that is it requires that ρ'0 -ρ0 ≥ μ. In addition, as in the discussion above it is likely that the supplier will be in a position to charge a premium for the trade credit financing. Denote this premium by kμ. The feasibility constraint for trade credit is then that ρ'0 -ρ0 ≥ (1 + kμ)μ.
Notice that this feasibility constraint is very likely to be tighter than that for the purchase obligation (ρ'0 -ρ0 ≥ kμ). There is no reason why kμ should be lower than the premium k that the firm pays for the forward contract. More importantly, the key advantage of the forward contract is that the firm can use it to transfer cash across states. In exchanging for receiving a transfer of cash equal to μ in the bad state λx, the firm makes an additional payment μ in the good state λ(1-x).
This transfer of cash across states cannot be replicated by trade credit financing since it is a "spot contract". That is the main reason why the purchase obligation is likely to relax financing constraints by more than trade credit financing.
We summarize this discussion in the following result:
Result 2: Under forward (purchase obligation) hedging, if k μ ≤ ρ'0 -ρ0 and λ 2 ( R -ρ) > k μ, the optimal continuation policy is θ = 1 and the forward position is F* = μ (full hedging). The associated payoff is given by UF in equation (12). In addition, if k < 1 + kμ the purchase obligation weakly dominates trade credit financing.
Given results 1 and 2 it is straightforward to compare the payoffs of the two options (futures and forwards) and derive implications. We have that:
UF -Uf (θ*) = (λ(1 -θ*)/2)( R -ρ) + (q -1) ζf(θ*) -kμ
Thus the analysis generates the following implications, which are summarized in result 3:
Result 3: The firm is more likely to choose forwards over futures if -k is small; -A and ρ0 are small; -λ (R -ρ) is large;
-(q -1) ζ is large.
The first result is obvious given that k captures the forward premium. The second result comes from the fact that increases in A and ρ0 relax the firm's financing constraint and thus make futures hedging more appealing relative to forwards. The third result comes from the fact that using futures exposes the firm to liquidity risk when θ* < 1. Thus when the expected liquidation loss is high firms are more likely to choose forwards. Finally, result 4 captures the fact that futures become less attractive if the required margin position is larger or more costly.
Finally, notice that the solution derived here has the property that θ*≤ 1 = θF. Thus, firms that use the forward contract in equilibrium exhibit higher investment, conditional on the liquidity shock happening. This result is a direct consequence of the fact that purchase obligations relax financing constraints. If the cost of the purchase obligation is high (because suppliers have a lot of bargaining power for example), then some firms may find it optimal to use futures. Since futures contracts tighten financing constraints, firms that chooses futures may have to engage in partial hedging and invest less (e.g., liquidate more) in equilibrium to meet feasibility constraints.
